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1 Andersen and Carlson (1972)
discuss the central role of
expectations in the St. Louis
model. We further discuss their
modeling of expectations
below.
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T
he St. Louis model of the early 1970s,
as described by Andersen and Carlson
(1972), was a small-scale monetarist
model of economic activity. Its structure
was sharply at variance with the frame-
work of the major, larger scale macro-
econometric models used for policy
analysis by the Federal Reserve, both at the
time of the inception of the St. Louis
model and today.
The St. Louis model had four major
features:
• It was sufﬁciently small that one
could actually understand how it
worked by looking at the model’s
behavioral equations and by con-
ducting simulations of it.
• It could be used for policy analy-
sis, speciﬁcally for studying the ef-
fects of monetary and ﬁscal policy
on inﬂation, output, and interest
rates.
• The monetarist background of its
authors meant that the model (1)
focused on the quantity of money
as the key measure of the stance of
monetary policy and (2) contained
structural linkages from money to
economic activity that are now
widely accepted, including the cen-
tral role of a long-run demand for
money that is a relatively stable
function of a small number of 
variables.
• It combined short-run non-neutrality
of changes in money with long-run
neutrality, in line with the perspec-
tive of Friedman and Schwartz
(1963a and b). 
With Lucas’ (1976) critique of policy
evaluation, the St. Louis model was largely
abandoned by monetarists. The model fell
victim to the critique in a particularly rapid
and complete manner because its builders
had stressed that it contained quantita-
tively important effects of expectations.1
In this article, we construct a small-
scale modern macroeconomic model that
can be used to study the effects of alterna-
tive monetary and ﬁscal policies in a man-
ner consistent with Lucas’ recommenda-
tions. That is, we build a rational
expectations macroeconomic model in
which the intertemporal optimization
problems of households and ﬁrms are ex-
plicitly described. We call this a St. Louis
model of the 21st century because we be-
lieve it is the type of small-scale macro-
economic model that will be systematically
employed for the purpose of policy analy-
sis by central banks in the coming years.
The model is monetarist in ﬁve speciﬁc
ways that it shares with the St. Louis
model:
• Our model contains a stable de-
mand for money that is invariant to
alternative monetary policies. 
• It incorporates short-run non-
neutrality of money with long-run
neutrality.
• Frictions in the price-setting process
yield a short-run non-neutrality of
money that is quantitatively and
economically important.
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• Once one takes into account antici-
pated price change, these frictions
lead to no quantitatively important
long-run trade-off between inﬂation
and real activity.
• Our model places a central empha-
sis on expectations in consumption
choices, investment decisions, asset
valuation, and price determination
in the tradition of Irving Fisher and
Milton Friedman.
We use this model to study an impor-
tant question in monetary economics that
is currently policy-relevant at central
banks around the world: What are the
consequences of adopting an inﬂation-
targeting rule for monetary policy? We
provide detailed information on two ver-
sions of this question. First, since most
central banks seek to target rates of inﬂa-
tion that are low by the historical stan-
dards of their countries, we ask, What are
the beneﬁts (or costs) of having a low rate
of inﬂation? Second, since critics of inﬂa-
tion targets are frequently concerned that
these may interfere with stabilization pol-
icy, we ask, In a setting with sticky prices
and demand-determined output, how do
the responses of the economy to various
shocks differ from those which would
occur if prices were ﬂexible?
Our model’s answers to these ques-
tions are very monetarist. First, there are
major beneﬁts to setting low rates of in-
ﬂation. That is, Friedman’s prescription
for long-run monetary policy (setting the
nominal interest rate to zero) approxi-
mately holds in the long run of our
model economy even though we have
some imperfect market “frictions” of the
form stressed by Tobin (1972a and b).
Even if one does not go all the way to a
zero nominal interest rate, there are quan-
titatively important long-run welfare gains
from moving from an inﬂation rate of 5
percent to price stability (0 percent inﬂa-
tion). Second, under a regime of perfect
inﬂation targeting (in which the path of
the price level is speciﬁed exactly by the
monetary authority), we ﬁnd that the re-
sponses of our sticky price model are es-
sentially identical to those of a ﬂexible
price economy.
Our analysis thus suggests that there
are major beneﬁts to implementing an 
inﬂation-targeting regime with a low target
rate of inﬂation. To further explore issues
that arise in the implementation of this
regime, we consider (1) the dynamic be-
havior of the economy if a target path for
the price level is implemented with an in-
terest rate rule and (2) the dynamic behav-
ior of real activity if a credible, low inﬂa-
tion path is implemented immediately. We
ﬁnd that it is indeed feasible to implement
a policy of targeting the path of the price
level with an interest rate rule. We also
ﬁnd that there is zero cost of immediately
introducing a credible low inﬂation
program.
THE ST. LOUIS MODEL
CIRCA 1972
The St. Louis model of macroeconomic
activity was a small macroeconometric
model containing ﬁve structural equations,
as spelled out in Andersen and Carlson
(1972): a total spending equation, a price
equation, a long-term interest rate equa-
tion, a deﬁnition of anticipated price
changes based on the long-term interest
rate equation, and an Okun’s law (1962)
link between an output gap and unem-
ployment. In addition, in the back-
ground, there were methods of measur-
ing the trend level of real economic
activity and the normal level of unem-
ployment.
Money Demand and Expenditure
The centerpiece of the St. Louis
model was a total spending equation, put
forward in Andersen and Jordan (1968),
that linked the change in nominal gross
national product to four-quarter distrib-
uted lags of changes in the nominal
money stock and of high-employment
federal government expenditures. Given
that the effects of high-employment ex-
penditures were small, this speciﬁcationMAY/ JU N E 1 9 9 6
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was widely viewed as resulting from a
monetarist speciﬁcation of the demand
for money—one with an income elasticity
of unity and an interest rate elasticity of
zero.
In the macroeconometric model, this
speciﬁcation was the econometric embodi-
ment of the Friedman and Schwartz
(1963a and b) method of taking nominal
income as proximately exogenous. It could
be employed to discuss the effect of mone-
tary changes on nominal income, as in 
Andersen and Jordan (1968), without dis-
cussing the division of nominal income
into price level and real output.
Price Adjustment
As elaborated in Andersen and
Carlson (1972), the St. Louis model em-
ployed a price equation to describe the di-
vision of nominal income into prices and
output. That speciﬁcation related the
change in the price level to two factors.
First, anticipated changes in prices entered
with a coefﬁcient of 0.86, so that the price
equation was taken to be importantly in-
ﬂuenced by the beliefs of price setters. Sec-
ond, a four-quarter distributed lag of
changes in nominal income was included
as a measure of demand pressure in the
macroeconomy.
The builders of the St. Louis model
contrasted their approach with the ap-
proach used to construct traditional price
equations, such as those presented by
Eckstein and Fromm (1968). Those who
built the St. Louis model emphasized that
their tractable speciﬁcation included im-
portant expectations effects and permitted
the simultaneous determination of prices
and output. This latter feature was sufﬁ-
ciently novel, relative to the standard
econometric practice of relating price
changes to real demand pressure measures,
that it warranted extensive discussion by
Tobin (1972a and b) in his summary of
the conference that led to the Eckstein
(1972) volume. Since the coefﬁcients on
the nominal demand variables summed to
0.10, the model also implied a Phillips
curve—deﬁned by Andersen and Carlson
(1972) to be the joint time paths of unem-
ployment and inﬂation arising from their
model, which involved only a very small
effect of sustained inﬂation on real activity.
This small trade-off is contrasted with
other contemporary studies such as 
de Menil and Enzler (1972), Klein (1972),
Bodkin (1972), and Eckstein and Wyss
(1972).
Expectations
An unusual feature of the St. Louis
model was its modeling of expectations.
Andersen and Carlson (1972) stressed that
expected prices played a key role in the
model and that their explicit speciﬁcation
of an expectations mechanism allowed
them to explore the trade-off between in-
ﬂation and unemployment at various hori-
zons. They used the long-term interest rate
as an important empirical indicator of ex-
pected inﬂation and, for this reason, also
included a structural equation determining
the long-term interest rate. The details of
their expectations scheme were sharply
criticized by Gordon (1972) on theoretical
and empirical grounds, although many
practical macroeconomists now routinely
use the long-term nominal interest rate
as a guide to long-term inﬂation expec-
tations.
A ST. LOUIS MODEL OF
THE 21ST CENTURY
Many of the structural equations of
our model economy are obtained by
studying the optimization problems of
households and ﬁrms. In addition, the
structural equations include resource con-
straints and the policy rule of the central
bank.
Monetary Services and
the Demand for Money
In our model economy, there is a well-
deﬁned demand for money that one can
determine from a problem of cost mini-
mization. That is, one can deﬁne a de-
mand for money conditional on a patternof expenditure determined as part of
a more general utility maximization
problem.
The demand for money stems from a
transactions technology—a “shopping
time technology” in the terminology of
McCallum and Goodfriend (1987)—which
governs the amount of time that must be
spent to undertake real consumption activ-
ity within the period t of our discrete time
setup. This shopping time function speci-
ﬁes that time devoted to transactions activ-
ity depends negatively on the ratio of the
amount of real money balances (mt) to
the amount of real consumption expendi-
ture (ct):
(1) ht =h m
ct
t .
Throughout, we use notation in which
lowercase letters refer to real variables and
uppercase letters refer to nominal variables
so that mt is the quantity of real balances
and is equal to Mt/Pt, where Mt is the stock
of money held during the period and Pt is
the price level.
The opportunity cost of a unit of time
spent shopping is given by the real wage
rate. The opportunity cost of choosing to
hold a unit of money during period t is the
discounted value of interest forgone next

















through selection of the quantity of real
balances accordingly requires that












which implicitly deﬁnes the demand for





is the marginal time saving that arises
from holding an additional unit of cash
balances per unit of consumption expendi-
ture. (We use Dh to denote the derivative
of the h function with respect to the ratio
m/c, viewing it as a function of this single
variable.) In our theoretical analysis, we
assume that this time saving is diminish-
ing in the ratio (m/c). Our empirical work
justiﬁes this assumption.
Notice that if the real wage and real
consumption grow at the same rate and
the nominal interest rate is constant over
time, then our speciﬁcation implies that
there is constant “consumption velocity.”
That is, there is no trend in the ratio m/c.





























This functional form for real money
demand per unit of expenditure is close to
the constant elasticity structure that is fre-
quently studied in the literature. Notably,
if  =0, then there is a loglinear money de-
mand function,




2 Our timing convention for
money demand embodies a
view of the average cash bal-
ance holdings as a durable
good (as in Friedman, 1969)
and is best exposited as fol-
lows. Suppose that the evolu-






where Yt is some measure of
nominal income and Btis the
quantity of bonds maturing at t.
Accordingly, the date tcost of
holding a unit of money from t
to t +1(Mt) is the discounted





as in the text.
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there to be a ﬁnite “satiation” level of real
cash balances, m= [ ]
-vc, which occurs as
a limiting case when the nominal interest
rate is zero. We choose this parametric
form for the Dh(mt/ct) function because we
want to generate a demand for money that
is relatively conventional, while leaving
open the issue of whether there is a ﬁnite




leads to demand for consumption (ct)and
supply of labor (nt), given the allocation
of time to shopping (ht) discussed above.






where the momentary utility function im-
plies that both consumption and leisure (lt)
are goods. Later in the analysis we adopt a
parametric speciﬁcation of this function
that has been much used in the real business
cycle literature.
Individuals choose contingency plans
for consumption, labor supply, real bal-
ances, shopping time, and leisure to maxi-
mize expected utility subject to a present

















as well as a time constraint that restricts
work, shopping time, and leisure,
(4) nt+j+ lt+j+ ht+j=1.
In addition, as discussed above, there
is a technology linking shopping time to
current expenditure, ct and real cash bal-
ances, mt. Since these speciﬁcations are
standard, we will review them relatively
brieﬂy. First, in the present value budget
constraint, we are discounting nominal
cash ﬂows at date t+j by the discount factor
Dt,j.3 Second, also in this expression, we
have real prices of work and cash balance
holding: wt is the real wage(Wt/Pt where
Wt is the nominal wage) and the rental
price of a unit of real cash is Rt/(1 + Rt),
as discussed above. Third, the time con-
straint includes time spent “shopping,” as
well as at working and at leisure: Market
work is a residual given determination of
leisure demand from utility maximization
and time spent shopping from cost mini-
mization.
Maximization of utility subject to
these constraints leads to the following
efﬁciency conditions for consumption,
leisure, and money balances. These 
efﬁciency conditions are structural equa-
tions of our small-scale macroeconomic
model. Since they contain expectations,
they must be evaluated as part of a 
complete rational expectations solution,
but presentation of them provides us
with the opportunity to describe the 
main implications that they have, taking
expectations as exogenous. First, the 
efﬁcient selection of consumption re-
quires 
(5) Et
















for j = 0, 1, . . . Second, the efﬁcient selec-
tion of labor requires
(6) Et
jD2u(ct+j,lt+j)=LtEtDt,j[Pt+jwt+j],
for j = 0, 1, . . . Third, the efﬁcient pattern

















for j = 0, 1, . . . In these expressions Lt is
the Lagrange multiplier on the wealth con-
straint and thus represents the lifetime
utility gain from an additional dollar of
wealth at t. We use the notation Diu to de-
3 In the interest of making the
model setup as simple as possi-
ble notationally, we are being a
little cavalier about the role of
uncertainty. For certain cash
ﬂows, our discount factor is




where Rtis the nominal interest
rate from tto t-1.
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function with respect to its ith argument.
In the ﬁrst of these efﬁciency condi-
tions, notice that the shopping time tech-
nology means that the Beckerian “full
price” of a unit of consumption at date t+j


















as well as the standard market cost com-
ponent Dt,jP t+j. In the second, notice that
there is the standard equating of the costs
and beneﬁts of forgoing a unit of leisure
and supplying it to the marketplace. To-
gether with the lifetime budget constraint,
these two equations implicitly determine
consumption and leisure demand at all
dates in line with a “permanent income”
approach to these two actions. The third
condition is the “money demand” cost
minimization condition discussed above.
Labor Demand, Investment, 
and Marginal Cost
As in Rotemberg (1987) and Blanchard
and Kiyotaki (1987), we assume that ﬁrms
have some market power, behaving as mo-
nopolistic competitors. (We contrast this to
a perfect competition situation in some
places below.) In this subsection, we focus
on the structural equations arising from the
representative ﬁrm’s decision problem that
concern production, labor, and investment
demand. In the next subsection, we focus
on pricing implications. It is accordingly
useful to think about breaking the ﬁrm into
three separate parts for planning purposes. 
First, the production unit takes as
given the output level of the ﬁrm and the
rental price of capital (a transfer price
from the investment unit): It determines
labor demand and capital demand so as to
minimize cost. Second, the investment
unit takes as given the market prices of in-
vestment goods and the rental price of
capital: It determines investment so as to
maximize the value of the ﬁrm. The activi-
ties of these two units are explored in this
section. Third, the pricing unit determines
the price of the ﬁrm’s output, taking into
account demand conditions and costs.
Throughout, the ﬁrm is taken to maximize




j=0Dt,j[Pt+j yt+j -W t+jnt+j Pt+j it+j],
subject to the production technology for
its ﬁnal product,
(7) yt+j =at+jf (nt+j,kt+j),
and the evolution equation for its capital, 
(8) kt+j+1-kt+j= (it+j/kt+j)kt+j kt+j,
where (i/k) is a positive, increasing and
concave function that embodies costs of
adjustment for the capital stock.
To describe decisions of the produc-
tion unit, we employ standard microeco-
nomic conditions for cost minimization.
For this purpose, we assume that the out-
put level is given at any arbitrary level 
Ù yt+j
and that capital can be rented at price Zt.




(10) Yt+jat+jD2 f (nt+j,kt+j)=Zt+j,
where Yt+j is the Lagrange multiplier on
the constraint yt+j=
Ù yt+j and Yt+j accord-
ingly is interpretable as nominal marginal
cost. The conventional solution to this
problem implies that marginal cost is a
function of the level of output; the pro-
ductivity shifter, at+j; and the factor prices,
Wt+j and Zt+j. It also depends on the form
of the production function: We assume
that the production function (equation 7)
is constant returns-to-scale, so that mar-
ginal cost is independent of output and
thus write Yt+j=Y(at+j,Wt+j,Zt+j).
In terms of the decisions of the invest-
ment unit, we assume that the ﬁrm
chooses the optimal investment pattern to
maximize its present discounted value
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pair of efﬁciency conditions,























In accord with the investment technol-
ogy that Hayashi (1982) and others have
used to rationalize a Tobin’s q-theory of in-
vestment, the ﬁrst of these speciﬁcations
indicates that the investment rate it/kt is
determined by the ratio of the (shadow)
price of installed capital (Qt) to the price of
replacement capital (Pt), that is, it is a
function of the ratio q = Q/P. The evolu-
tion of Qt over time takes into account the
discounted value of rentals accruing in the
future period, as well as the effect of capi-
tal accumulation on next period’s capital
stock and adjustment costs.4
Price Setting
The price-setting structure that we em-
ploy follows Calvo (1983), in ways that are
recommended by Rotemberg (1987) and are
similar to the recent work of Yun (1996).
Firms are assumed to be able to change their
prices only in speciﬁc states of nature and
must otherwise satisfy all demand at the
quoted price. As we will see, this latter re-
quirement—that we treat as one of the insti-
tutions of the marketplace—has important
consequences for optimal price setting.
The price-adjustment event occurs
with probability 1- so that with probabil-
ity h the ﬁrm is stuck with a predeter-
mined nominal price. Accordingly, the ex-
pected time of price ﬁxity is
(1- )1+ (1- )2+...+
n-1(1- ) + ...,
which is equal to (1- )
-1. We assume that
the average ﬁrm adjusts its price every
four quarters (once per year) so that
=.75, but we also experiment with higher
values. The stochastic price-setting speciﬁ-
cation also implies a (stationary) distribu-
tion of ﬁrms in terms of the time that they
last adjusted their price. The fraction of
ﬁrms that last adjusted price j periods ago,
j, is given by  j=(1- )
j.
This price-setting speciﬁcation cap-
tures two key features of price setting that
have been much emphasized by macro-
economists working on price adjustment:
The timing and magnitude of price adjust-
ments vary widely across ﬁrms in ways
that appear stochastic to an outside ob-
server. However, given that the probability
of price adjustment h is exogenous in the
Calvo setting, the frequency of price ad-
justment cannot adjust to variations in the
state of the economy: It cannot change ei-
ther with the average rate of inﬂation or
with the stage of the business cycle.5
We assume that ﬁrms are monopolistic
competitors and that each faces a date t







if it last adjusted its price j periods ago
and selected the price P
*
t-j.6 In this expres-
sion, dt is a demand shifter that depends
on the state of the economy and P t is the











Using the stationary fractions given above,
the dynamics of the aggregate price level P t
can be reduced to
(15) P t=[(1- )(P
*
t )




(1- )represents the inﬂuence of
the prices ch a rged by the fraction of ﬁrm s




(1- e ) re p re sents the inﬂuence of
the ﬁrms that do change prices in periodt.
In this time-dependent price-adjust-






4 The introduction of investment
adjustment costs is not neces-
sary to any of the main conclu-
sions that follow from in our
analysis below. However, as a
consequence of the evidence
summarized in Chirinko
(1993), there is a good reason
for incorporating this structural
aspect into a modern macroeco-
nomic model.
5 Nevertheless, the Calvo setup is
a natural starting point for our
analysis: In Dotsey, King, and
Wolman (1996), we argue
that a somewhat more general
time-dependent speciﬁcation is
formally a ﬁrst-order approxima-
tion to a richer state-dependent
price-adjustment model.
6 This speciﬁcation requires that
we view the consumption and
investment goods as the same
constant elasticity of substitu-
tion “aggregator” of differenti-
ated products. Blanchard and
Kiyotaki (1987) derive such
individual product demand func-
tions for a model with just a
consumption good.
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to equate marginal revenue and mar-
ginal cost in a discounted, expected 
value sense. Dynamic marginal revenue









The form of this expression reﬂects
the fact that the price at t j will remain at
the chosen level P
*
t with probability n
j.
Similarly, the dynamic marginal cost asso-











We can simplify these expressions as in
the standard static case and then equate
dynamic marginal cost and revenue to ob-
tain a price that it is optimal to charge:
.
Three implications of this expression
are worth elucidating. First, if marginal
cost were constant over time at the level
Y, then we obtain 
P
*= -1 Y,
so that the ratio 
= -1,
is interpretable as the markup just as in
the static case. Second, in the dynamic
setting, price setting is inﬂuenced by 
the scale of output (demand) unless the
entire sequence of outputs in the numer-
ator and denominator expressions are
scaled by a common factor. Third, opti-
mal price setting in the Calvo environ-
ment involves forecasting both demand
and costs.
Taking the price-setting rule (equation
16) and the price index (equation 15) to-
gether, it is clear that there is long-run ho-
mogeneity of nominal prices in terms of
nominal costs:
P=P
*= -1 Y= -1 aD1
W
f (n,k) .
Accordingly , as all of the other behavioral
equations of our model are written in real
terms, it follows that our model will dis-
play long-run neutrality of money:
Permanent changes in the quantity of M
will ultimately affect prices and not output,
even with short-run rigidity of prices.
However, there will be a departure from
superneutrality, in that the same frictions
that lead to (1) the demand for money and
(2) the short-run rigidity of prices will
mean that there will be real effects of sus-
tained inﬂation. In the next section we
quantify these real effects.
The Marginal and Average Markup
Given that ﬁrms are charging different
prices in our setting, it is clear that there
will be different values of markups across
ﬁrms. We deﬁne the marginal markup as
that earned by ﬁrms which are currently





We deﬁne the average markup as the ratio
of the aggregate price level to marginal
cost, that is,
t =Pt/Yt.
In a steady state with zero inﬂation, both





but in steady states with inﬂation or deﬂa-
tion, there will no longer be this equality.
Similarly, in response to business ﬂuctua-
tions, the fact that part of the price level is
predetermined will lead to different time-
series variation in the marginal and aver-
age markup.












jdt+ j t+ j P
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POLICY IN THE LONG RUN
A natural method for determining the
target rate of inﬂation is to choose that rate
of inﬂation which maximizes the welfare of
the representative household. In this section
we conduct such an analysis for the “long
run,” deﬁned as a steady-state situation in
which all variables grow at constant rates in
ways that are consistent with the model
economy outlined in the previous section.
We solve the equations of the model for the
link between inﬂation and welfare, isolating
the factors that are important for determin-
ing the long-run optimal inﬂation policy.
In models with perfect competition
and continuously adjusted prices, there is
a presumption that the optimal inﬂation
policy is that which makes the private
cost of holding money equal to the social 
cost of production, that is, a nominal in-
terest rate of zero. Given a positive real 
interest rate, this condition represents a
prescription for long-run deﬂation policy
that was ﬁrst made by Milton Friedman
(1969). Friedman’s conclusion has been
replicated in a wide range of theoretical
environments.
In particular, letting the rate of inﬂa-
tion be  and the level of the real interest
rate be r, it follows that the deﬁnition
(1 + R) = (1 + r)(1 + ) and the Friedman
rule condition R = 0 together imply that






where the superscript indicates that this is
the Friedman rule level of the inﬂation
rate. Long-term U.S. data compiled by
Ibbotson and Sinquefeld (1982) indicates
that the average real return on Treasury
bills is between 0 percent and 1 percent so
that this represents a recommendation for
at most a small deﬂation.
Estimating the Welfare Gains
from Lower Inﬂation
One measure of the gains from lower
inﬂation may be computed as the time
savings generated as agents increase their
cash balances, gains that are sometimes
viewed as small. Following the provoca-
tive work of Lucas (1993), there has been
much recent interest in the magnitudes of
these gains. In this article, we use a
benchmark estimate from Wolman
(1996), the nature of which is displayed
in Figure 1.
In the ﬁrst step, the three-parameter
money-demand function (equation 3) 
is ﬁt to annual U.S. time-series data 
over the 1915–92 period. Each annual
observation on the pair of ratios, m/c
and (c/w)(R/(1 + R)), enters as a dot in
the top panel of Figure 1.7 The represen-
tative individual holds cash balances
equal to 1.62 quarters of consumption
expenditure at the sample mean (denoted
by a “+” in the top panel of Figure 1).
The values of  , , and  are chosen to
provide a best ﬁt in a least squares sense,
and the solid line in the top panel traces
out the ﬁtted relationship. As it turns
out, the estimates indicate a satiation
level of real cash balances. Cash balances
equal 2.7 quarters of consumption ex-
penditure at the estimated satiation level,
which is somewhat smaller than the 
maximum cash balances in the sample
(about 3.3 quarters of consumption 
expenditure).
In the second step, we compute 
the time savings that arise as the inﬂa-
tion rate is lowered from a benchmark
level of 5 percent per year. For this 
purpose, we employ the estimated param-
eter values obtained in the ﬁrst step and
also the sample average value of c/w over
1915–92. That is, given the parameters,
the marginal time savings at any level of










Substituting in the formula for the real
demand for money from equation 3 and
assuming that the real interest rate is in-
variant to inﬂation, we can then deter-
mine the time savings of moving from
7 The money stock is M1. The
interst rate is a quarterly yield
on commercial paper. We form
m/cas the ratio of nominal
money to an annual nominal
consumption expenditure series
(including durables). We then
divide by population and
express the ﬁgure in terms of
quarterly time units by multiply-
ing by 4. Similarly, we divide
nominal quarterly per capita
consumption by a nominal
wage rate, measured as aver-
age hourly earnings of produc-
tion workers in manufacturing,
in current dollars. The average
value of the resulting c/w
series indicates that a represen-
tative worker requres 249
hours of work per quarter to
purchase consumption or about
20 hours per week. In terms of
interpreting Figure 1, however,
the reader should know that
we have rescaled c/wby divid-
ing by average quarterly hours
worked. Additional details on
the data (and the data them-
selves) are provided in a repli-
cation diskette that you can
request from the authors.
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integral of such time savings over the rel-
evant range. The lower panel of Figure 1
is the result of this computation. We ﬁnd
that a movement from a 5 percent rate of
inﬂation to a 0 percent rate of inﬂation
would lead to a saving of about 5 hours
per quarter. Adopting the Friedman rule
from an initial position of 5 percent inﬂa-
tion would lead to a saving of about 
7 hours per quarter. For an individual
working 40 hours per week for 12 weeks
in a quarter, these time savings represent
about 1 percent of his time. Since the av-
erage hours worked by an average work-
age individual is lower, about 20 hours
per week, it follows that the time saving
is roughly 2 percent.
The Markup and Inﬂation
In models with monopolistic com-
petition and staggered price setting, econ-
omists have long suggested that the 
Friedman rule is not desirable. One argu-
ment that is sometimes made for depart-
ing from the Friedman rule is that the
markup of price over marginal cost 
may depend negatively on the inﬂation
rate.8 Since higher levels of the markup
depress economic activity (acting like a
tax on factor supplies), the deﬂation envi-
sioned by Friedman would have social
costs, as well as social beneﬁts. Thus,
there is an open issue as to the level of
the optimal rate of inﬂation within setups
such as ours.
The average markup of price over
marginal cost that prevails in our economy
















These two factors are (1) the marginal
markup (deﬁned above as the ratio of
price to marginal cost for ﬁrms that are
free to adjust their prices) and (2) the
price adjustment gap (deﬁned as the ratio
of the general price level to the price
charged by ﬁrms that are free to adjust).
The price adjustment gap and inﬂation.







This expression is obtained by evaluating
equation 15 in a situation where Pt and P
*
t
are growing at the rate  . If there is no
inﬂation, then there is no price adjust-
ment gap in the steady state—all ﬁrms are
charging P*. At a higher rate of inﬂation,
it follows that Pt is less than P
*
t: A price
adjustment gap emerges. This gap reﬂects
the fact that higher inﬂation mechanically
erodes the real value of markups and thus
erodes relative prices set by ﬁrms in past
periods.
We think of this price adjustment gap








8 Several recent papers make
this point in differing settings.
Benabou (1992) suggests that
higher inﬂation may raise the
elasticity of demand in a search
model, thus lowering the
markup. In a model that shares
the core neoclassical structure
of this article, but uses a differ-
ing pattern of price dynamics,
Goodfriend (1995) also derives
a link between the markup and
inﬂation.
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Figure 1a,b
Time Cost of Inﬂation
(a) Actual and Estimated Demand for Money
(b) Time Saved
         
         
         
         
         
                                                     
     
                           
                                   






   
   
   
                     emphasized by traditional econometric
price equations such as those developed
in Eckstein and Fromm (1968). The im-
plicit assumption in such studies is that
ﬁrms set P
*
t as a ﬁxed markup over mar-
ginal cost  t. With such an assumption,
there is a substantial effect of a sustained
inﬂation on the markup and on macro-
economic activity (displayed in Figure 2).
In the top panel, we display the implica-
tions of equation 18 for the average
markup. To construct this diagram, we as-
sume that there is a gross markup equal
to 1.3 at zero inﬂation (so that the elas-
ticity of demand  , is 4.33). We also as-
sume that  = .75 (so that the average
duration of price ﬁxity is a year). Higher
rates of inﬂation erode the markup, which
approaches zero at an annual rate of inﬂa-
tion of about 25 percent per year. Since
the markup acts like a tax on real activity
(as discussed in Blanchard and Kiyotaki,
1987; Rotemberg and Woodford, 1991;
and Goodfriend, 1995), declines in its
level are associated with the substantial
increases in output shown in the lower
panel of Figure 2.
Concretely, if the price adjustment gap
were the only structural feature of price
dynamics, then an increase in inﬂation
from 5 percent to 10 percent would raise
output permanently by about 7 percent.
Effects of forward-looking price setting.
In a situation of sustained inﬂation, how-
ever, our model does not imply that price
adjusting ﬁrms behave in the manner that
underlies Figure 2. In particular, the ratio
of newly set prices to marginal cost—the






























This expression is a steady-state version of
equation 16 in which  is the real growth
rate of the economy,r
sis the real interest 
rate appropriate for discounting the ﬁrm’s
cash ﬂows (given by the real rate of interest




is the markup that would prevail in the ab-
sence of staggered price setting (that is,
with  = 0). The optimal pricing rule
makes this ratio depend positively on the
inﬂation rate. A higher expected rate of in-
ﬂation leads ﬁrms to set a higher price
when they are free to adjust, principally be-
cause they know that as long as their nomi-
nal price remains ﬁxed, inﬂation will erode
both their relative price and the real value
of any markup established today. The for-
mer erosion means there is increasing sub-
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Figure 2a,b
Implications of the 
Price Adjustment Gap
(a) Markup of Price over Marginal Cost
(b) Output Compared to Baseline 
of 5% Inﬂation
                                   
           
       
       
       
       
       
                     
       
                                   
           





                     
 
   
   
   stitution toward a product as long as its
price is ﬁxed. The latter erosion means 
that per-unit proﬁts fall for as long as a
price is ﬁxed. Since ﬁrms must ﬁll demand
at posted prices, they attempt to counter
these two effects by setting higher markups
in the face of higher inﬂation rates.
The Approximate Optimality
of the Friedman Rule
A striking feature of our setup is that
the Friedman rule is approximately opti-
mal under a wide range of assumptions
about the magnitude of price adjustment




and the speciﬁcation of the transactions
technology. By approximate optimality, we
mean the following. Since the transactions
technology implies a satiation point for cash
balances, at the Friedman rule, there must
be a zero loss to holding a slightly smaller
amount of real cash balances. Thus, if the
markup can be reduced by slightly more in-
ﬂation at the Friedman rule (as it can for the
parameters that we study), then there will
be an unambiguous welfare gain to increas-
ing inﬂation from the Friedman rule.9 Al-
though this point can be established for-
mally, one needs a microscopic inspection of
the welfare trade-off to ﬁnd it in the experi-
ments reported below: The maximum wel-
fare point occurs very close to the Friedman
rule.
The benchmark case. To begin, the
top panel of Figure 3 shows the relation-
ship between welfare in the steady state
and the rate of inﬂation for a benchmark
case. In this benchmark case, we assume
that
= .75,  =
- 1
= 1.3,
and make other assumptions about the
steady state of the model presented in
Table 1. (These other parameter assump-
tions are conventional in the quantitative
business cycle literature.) The reference
point for our analysis is a situation of
5 percent inﬂation, indicated by * in
Figure 3.
In models that abstract from varia-
tions in labor supply, a standard measure
of welfare is the fraction of steady-state
consumption that an individual would
give up to avoid a distortion (as in Lucas,
1990). In our setting with variable labor
supply, we use the measure of welfare de-
picted graphically in the lower panel of
Figure 3—the amount of additional con-
sumption expenditure that could be pur-
chased by an individual at an initial rela-
tive price of consumption and leisure.10
Although we measure the change in full
income along the vertical axis of the
lower panel of Figure 3, valuing changes
in leisure and consumption at a constant
relative price, we express the welfare ef-
fect as a fraction of measured national in-
come, so it is directly comparable to
other measures of welfare losses ex-
pressed as a fraction of steady-state na-
tional income.
The salient features of Figure 3 are
twofold. First, as the rate of inﬂation falls
toward
f = -1 percent from the reference
level of  = 5 percent there is a substan-
tial increase in welfare. Fundamentally,
this increase arises because there is a de-
crease in shopping time when the nomi-
nal interest rate falls and the associated
cost of money holding falls. Recent work
by Lucas (1993) has documented the
magnitude of these welfare gains in
economies simpler than those studied in
this article, namely ones that abstract
from variable labor supply, physical capi-
tal accumulation, and staggered price 
setting. He ﬁnds gains on the order of 
1.5 percent of national product, a useful
benchmark for our discussion.
In our setting, the magnitude of the 
welfare gain to pursuing the Friedman rule
is 1.1 percent of national income. The gain
to moving from 5 percent inﬂation to 0 per-
cent inﬂation is about .8 percent of national
income. Second, Figure 3 also shows that
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9 Michael Woodford and Preston
McAfee each forcefully pointed
out this conclusion to us during
presentations of this paper.
10This follows Baxter’s (1995)
analysis of tax distortions in a
variable labor supply setting.there are quantitatively important welfare
losses from raising inﬂation from the bench-
mark level of 5 percent: An increase in the
inﬂation rate from 5 percent to 12 percent
lowers welfare by 2 percent.
Interpretation. In Figure 1, there was
a gain from lowering inﬂation since the
society economized on transactions time.
In Figure 2, there was a gain from raising
inﬂation—inﬂation eroded markups and
lower markups stimulated economic activi-
ty. Given the magnitude of the real effects
in Figures 1 and 2, one would suspect a
strong case for high inﬂation. Yet, when
these two forces are combined (as in
Figure 3), there is a strong case for 
low inﬂation.
The main reason for this striking 
ﬁnding is that the experiment displayed 
in Figure 2 leaves out the incentives ﬁrms
have to change their price-setting behavior
in a situation of sustained inﬂation. That
is, in our model, a situation of positive
steady-state inﬂation involves two offset-
ting displacements relative to price stabil-
ity. The ﬁrst is that inﬂation opens a price








The second is that the marginal
markup rises with inﬂation as ﬁrms seek
to avoid an erosion of their relative price
and markup. Figure 4 contrasts the overall
effect of inﬂation on the steady-state
markup (dashed line) to the partial effect
from Figure 2 that takes into account only
the price adjustment gap (solid line).
There are two distinct regimes. Over
the range relevant for considering a de-
crease in inﬂation relative to the bench-
mark level of 5 percent, the average
markup is relatively unaffected by inﬂa-
tion: The incentives that ﬁrms have to
raise the marginal markup are just offset
by the decline (via the price adjustment
gap) in the average markup.11 For this
reason, the welfare analysis of inﬂation
coincides with Friedman’s analysis. Over
the range relevant for considering in-
creases in inﬂation relative to its bench-
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Table 1
P a r a m e t e r s
Figure 3a,b
Steady State Welfare
(a) Welfare Compared to 
Baseline of 5% Inﬂation
(b) The Welfare Measure
                     
       
       
       
       
         
         
         
         
         
             
                                   
                                         
       
       
       
                     
             
           
       
       
       
Own price demand elasticity 4.33
Probability price does not change 0.75
Multiplicative term in h ( ) function 0.01156
Curvature of h ( ) function 0.8004
Shift term in h ( ) function 0.0011
sn Labor share
2⁄3
Quarterly depreciation rate 0.025
Investment adj. cost parameter 2
-((i/k) ( ¢¢/ ¢))
(-1)
Quarterly real growth rate (3 percent annually) 0.0074
Quarterly inflation rate (5 percent annually) 0.0122
Utility discount factor (quarterly) 0.9917
Utility function: u(c,l) = ln(c) + 2.47×ln(l)mark level, signiﬁcant increases occur in
the average markup. This response stems
from an even larger effect on the mar-
ginal markup, that in turn reﬂects sufﬁ-
cient demand response to the real price
declines associated with inﬂation that
ﬁrms choose to increase the marginal
markup dramatically to avoid the
prospect of satisfying unproﬁtable de-
mand in the future.
Sensitivity analysis. We now present a
brief sensitivity analysis. Six dimensions ex-
ist along which it seems natural to explore
the robustness of the relationship between
welfare and inﬂation depicted in Figure 4.
• How different is the size of the cost
of inﬂation in our sticky price, mo-
nopolistically competitive setting
from that in a ﬂexible price, per-
fectly competitive setting?
• How would this cost be overesti-
mated if one viewed price setters 
as myopic, in the same way we 
did in constructing Figure 1 and 
as was frequently done in traditional
Keynesian macroeconometric 
models?
• How different would the costs of in-
ﬂation be if the economy were
much less competitive?
• How sensitive is the cost of inﬂation
to higher values of  , that is, to
more inertia in prices? 
• How is the cost of inﬂation affected
by eliminating the inﬂation distor-
tion between consumption and
leisure?
• How sensitive is the cost of inﬂation
to our assumption that there is a sa-
tiation level of real cash balances? 
The six panels of Figure 5 display the
answers to these questions. In each panel,
we use the dashed line to re p resent the re s u l t s
f rom the benchmark case and a solid line to
re p resent those from the case under study.
Variations in competition, price rigidity,
and forward-looking behavior . In conduct-
ing the ﬁrst four alterations in the model,
we assumed that the economies were each
calibrated at a 5 percent inﬂation rate, 
so that the new and old lines all rotate
through the 5 percent inﬂation point. In
panel A the effect of moving to perfect
competition and ﬂexible prices is shown:
There is minimal difference. In panel B we
provide a case similar to that underlying
Figure 2 in which price setters are assumed
not to be forward-looking: It is the single
case we have found of a setting in which
there is a case for increased inﬂation (a
very strong one). In panel C we see the ef-
fect of raising the static markup from 1.3 to
3: The effect is to slightly increase the wel-
fare beneﬁt from reducing inﬂation. The
analysis of Goodfriend (1995) can be used
to explain this result. With less competi-
tion (higher  ), the wage rate is a smaller
fraction of labor’s marginal product and
output is correspondingly further below 
its efﬁcient level. Thus, when labor ﬂows
out of transactions activity and into pro-
ductive activity, there is a larger welfare
gain. In panel D we see the effect of raising
the expected duration of price setting from
4 quarters to 10 quarters, that is, the effects
of an increase in  from .75 to .8. There is
little effect on the beneﬁts from lower inﬂa-
tion but a larger increase in costs of higher
inﬂation.12
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11For the parameter values we
use, the markup is decreasing
with inﬂation in a neighborhood
of the Friedman rule. This leads
to the approximate optimality
result discussed in the introduc-
tion to this section.
12The  = .8 value is an upper
bound for our analysis, given
our demand parameter ( or
). With higher values of  ,
there is a sufﬁciently large cost
of getting stuck with a ﬁxed
price that it is optimal not to
open a ﬁrm. This example indi-
cates an unfortunate tension
between matching short-run
price dynamics and longer run
inﬂation responses in the Calvo
model, one reason for the gen-
eralizations considered in
Dotsey, King, and Wolman
(1996).
                                   
                   
       
       
       
       
       
           
       
Figure 4
The Markup and InﬂationVariations in the money demand speci -
ﬁcation. In panel E we show the effect of
eliminating the implications that the
money demand function has for the full
















to zero in the expression (equation 5) for
optimal consumption. We view this as the
traditional neoclassical and monetarist 
procedure of ignoring the implications of
the cost of money holding for the full price
of consumption—it is used, for example, in
most textbooks with strong neoclassical 
underpinnings, such as Bailey (1971), 
Barro (1990), and Abel and Bernanke
(1992). However, this assumption is the 
polar opposite of that made in cash-in-
advance models of money, where the trans-
actions technology implicitly makes varia-
tions in the ratio of consumption to money
inﬁnitely expensive in terms of time. That
is, in the cash-in-advance analysis of 
Cooley and Hansen (1992), there is only a
full price effect of inﬂation, not a time re-
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       allocation effect associated with costly sub-
stitutions in transactions activities designed
to avoid the inﬂation tax. Panel E shows
small differences in our cost of inﬂation
measure for small rates of inﬂation, but
these become more pronounced as the inﬂa-
tion rate increases. Thus, the traditional
neoclassical and monetarist procedure is a
good approximation for small and moder-
ate inﬂations, but it would likely not be for
hyperinﬂations. In panel F , we investigate
the effect of ruling out satiation in real bal-
ances (imposing the restriction  =0 when
estimating the money demand function).
Lucas (1993) imposes such an assumption
that has the effect of making the Friedman
rule exactly rather than approximately op-
timal.13However, in other ways it has little 
effect on our welfare computations.
INFLATION TARGETING
AND BUSINESS CYCLES
Having established that beneﬁts to tar-
geting a low rate of inﬂation exist in the
long run, we turn next to evaluating how a
policy of inﬂation targeting inﬂuences the
dynamic response of our economy to vari-
ous shocks. For this purpose, we use a per-
fect inﬂation targeting scheme in which the
central bank is presumed to manipulate the
money supply each period so as to achieve
exactly the target rate of inﬂation (an an-
nualized 5 percent rate of inﬂation in our
experiments). Then we ask how real activ-
ity responds to productivity and money de-
mand shocks that we take to be two major
sources of disturbances. We model these as
random walk shocks because we think
these are largely permanent in nature.
The motivation for this part of the in-
vestigation is to see what gains or losses
would arise if the central bank could target
the inﬂation rate accurately. In particular,
we are concerned with whether price-level
targeting introduces major gaps relative to
the real outcomes that would arise if there
were perfect price ﬂexibility. The bottom
line is that it does not, according to both
“eyeball” and formal welfare measures. 
In fact, compared with a policy of money 
supply targeting, inﬂation targeting 
succeeds in eliminating these gaps. To un-
derstand this result, it is necessary to 
understand how real activity responds 
to shocks under money supply targeting.
Our analyses of productivity and money
demand shocks thus begin with this case.
We subsequently discuss how and why re-
sponses differ under inﬂation targeting.
Productivity Shocks
Figure 6 displays the impulse response
functions to a permanent productivity
shock of output, consumption, investment,
hours, the average markup, the real wage,
the real interest rate, and real balances, as-
suming that the money growth rate is held
constant.14The dashed lines describe a 
ﬂexible price economy ( =0), and the 
solid lines describe a sticky price economy
( =.75). To explain the marked differences
between the two sets of curves, it is helpful
to decompose the average markup as in the
section on estimating the welfare gains from
lower inﬂation. We can use the decomposi-












also recognizing that the price level
evolves according to equation 15 to 
describe the price adjustment gap as 
a function of the current and past price
level. 
Productivity shock dynamics under a
ﬁxed money supply rule. Under a ﬁxed
money supply rule, we ﬁnd the intuitive
result that a permanent productivity shock
will raise output (Figure 6, panel A) and
lower the current price level from its trend
when prices are ﬂexible. Since capital and
consumption grow slowly toward the new
steady state, a situation of sustained deﬂa-
tion is shown in Figure 6: This is to be in-
terpreted as the price level rising at less
than the benchmark 5 percent rate. 
If prices are sticky, there is also pres-
sure for deﬂation. Accordingly, the ﬁrst
term in the markup expression (equation
1 -
1 - (Pt-1/Pt)(1- )
13That is, the slope of the solid
line is inﬁnitely negative at
f in Lucas’s analysis rather
than slightly positive as in our
analysis.
14The impulse response functions
in Figures 6 to 10 were gener-
ated by linearizing the model
around its deterministic steady-
state growth path, using the
singular linear system methods
detailed in King and Watson
(1995a and b).
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Figure 6 a–h
Money Supply Targeting, 
Response to a Permanent Productivity Shock
_ _ _ _ _  0    _______  .75
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(a) Output20) rises when the price level falls, in-
creasing the markup: This is the ﬂip side
of the inﬂation erosion effect discussed in
the section on the price adjustment gap
and inﬂation. Since the productivity shock
lowers marginal cost at date t and in all fu-
ture dates, there is a relatively small effect






The average markup rises in response 
to the productivity shock. A rise in the
markup (Figure 6, panel E) implies an in-
crease in the wedge between the marginal
product of labor and the real wage (Figure
6, panel F). Since the wedge will eventu-
ally return to its steady-state level, there is
a strong substitution effect that causes
labor input (Figure 6, panel D) to fall in
the impact period.
The direction of the effect on labor
contrasts with the case in which prices are
ﬂexible and markups never deviate from
e/(e-1). In this case, labor input rises as
agents capitalize on the temporarily high
real interest rate. Thus under a money
supply target, a sticky price economy re-
sponds to shocks in a qualitatively differ-
ent manner than a ﬂexible price economy.
Productivity shock dynamics with a per -
fect inﬂation target. The results differ sub-
stantially when there is a policy of perfectly
targeting the inﬂation rate. Figure 7 displays
comparable impulse response functions in
this case (the target inﬂation rate is 5 per-
cent). A glance at Figure 7 reveals that, un-
like the money growth target case, there is
no qualitative difference between the re-
sponses under ﬁxed and ﬂexible prices. The
average markup decomposition is again
helpful in understanding this result. Be-
cause inﬂation targeting prevents shocks
from affecting the price level, it eliminates
the price adjustment gap channel—the ﬁrst
term in the decomposition—so that there is
no tendency for the markup to rise (Figure
7, panel E). With the markup essentially un-
changed, the real wage fully inherits the in-
crease in productivity. Thus, a major com-
ponent of the substitution effect acting to
decrease labor supply disappears and, as in
the ﬂexible price model, hours rise in accord
with the opposing substitution effect of a
temporarily high real interest rate (Figure 7,
panels F , D, and G). Thus, perfect inﬂation
targeting effectively makes  a sticky-price
economy behave like a ﬂexible price econ-
omy: The key is that inﬂation targeting in-
troduces a monetary accommodation that
avoids the necessity for the price level to fall




Figure 8 displays the results of a perma-
nent shock to the demand for money under
ﬁxed money supply and price level paths,
with the latter being equivalent to the out-
come under ﬂexible prices just as it was in
response to a technology shock. Our money
demand shock corresponds to a change in
the cash balance efﬁciency condition such
that there is a 1 percent higher demand for
real balances at given levels of consumption,
the real wage rate and the nominal interest
rate. An important difference is evident be-
tween the two sets of results shown in Fig-
ure 8: An increase in money demand pro-
duces a decline in output if there is a ﬁxed
path of money, whereas it has no effect on
output if policy is geared toward a stabiliz-
ing the price level.
IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
We next discuss two sets of issues
that would be a necessary part of imple-
menting a policy rule like that discussed
above. First, we ask whether it is possible
to use the nominal interest rate as an 
instrument to implement a policy of 
controlling the price level in our model
economy. Second, we investigate the con-
sequences of immediately transiting to a
lower inﬂation rate.
Implementation with an Interest
Rate Instrument
Many central banks employ a short-
term interest rate as the instrument by
15A formal welfare comparison
supports the conclusion that
sticky price and ﬂexible price
economies are not very differ-
ent under perfect inﬂation tar-
geting. To produce this measure
in an earlier draft of the article,
we determined the welfare
effect of a shock using the
dynamic equivalent of the mea-
sure described in the section on
optimal inﬂation policy in the
long run and illustrated in the
lower panel of Figure 2. Linear
approximation methods were
used to compute these welfare
changes that are related to the
measure of the Hicksian wealth
effects of shocks produced in
King (1993).
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Figure 8 a–h
Response to a Permanent Money Demand Shock
Inﬂation Target (o)   Money Supply Target (+)
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               which monetary policy is implemented. To
consider how our economy might respond
to such an operating policy, we posit a
monetary policy rule of the form:
Rt = f×[log(Pt) - log(Pt)],
log(Pt) = log(Pt t) + .
The ﬁrst of these speciﬁcations indicates
that the monetary authority raises the
short-term nominal interest rate in re-
sponse to increases in the general price
level (Pt) relative to its trend path (Pt),
since we assume that the parameter f is
positive. The second of these speciﬁcations
is our earlier requirement that the price
level grow at a ﬁxed target rate of inﬂa-
tion.16 In Figure 9, we reconsider the re-
sponse of the macroeconomy to an in-
crease in productivity under this rule,
distinguishing between a strong and weak
pattern of response.17
If the central bank follows a rule that 
requires it to respond strongly to deviations
of the price level from its target path, then 
it actually must respond very little, and the
economy’s behavior closely resembles that
under a perfect inﬂation target (these out-
comes are the “o” path in Figure 9). To
understand this rule, it is important to recall
a very small (maximum seven basis points)
response of the real interest rate under per-
fect price level targeting. Accordingly, by
keeping the nominal rate essentially con-
stant, the central bank can accommodate
the productivity shock and keep the price
level close to its target path. In this case, 
the post–Lucas-critique structure of the
model is important. The interest rate policy
keeps the price level close to the target be-
cause agents understand that deviations
from the target would trigger large interest
rate variations. This credible threat implies
that such interest rate variations need never
occur.
However, if the central bank responds
only weakly to departures from the target
path, then an overshooting of components
of real activity may occur in response to a
productivity shock. Essentially, in this set-
ting, the central bank allows a gap be-
tween the actual and target price level to
emerge as a result of the productivity
shock—given that the real interest rate
would rise under perfect inﬂation target-
ing, the policy rule makes the price level
(not shown) rise initially in response to
the shock, lowering the markup and rais-
ing real quantities. Later the price level
falls back to the target path, but this is of
little consequence for real activity since it
is largely forecasted by private agents.
Thus, when policy is implemented by
means of an interest rate instrument, the
economy’s response to shocks is highly
sensitive to the speciﬁc form of the policy
rule. Since rules involving interest rates
are inherently dynamic, understanding the
implications of different policy settings re-
quires an understanding of the patterns of
expectations generated by the rules in re-
sponse to a shock.
Timing of Implementation
If a central bank seeks to lower the in-
ﬂation rate in the long run through an 
inﬂation targeting rule, are there important
costs of immediate implementation? In
other words, should a gradual approach to
disinﬂation be preferred to an immediate
one within our model economy? Advo-
cates of gradualism sometimes argue that 
a recession will result from abrupt disin-
ﬂation. 
Figure 10 shows the results of an ex-
periment of lowering the annual rate of in-
ﬂation from 5 percent to 3 percent under
two alternative schemes. Under an inﬂa-
tion rule, there is no transitional output
loss from disinﬂation—there is simply a
small gain in real activity as labor ﬂows
out of transactions activity and into the
production of ﬁnal goods. This outcome
results from the structure of price dynam-
ics in the Calvo model, as previously dis-
cussed by Buiter and Miller (1985) and
Ball (1994). Inﬂation can readily jump
from one of the steady states (considered
above) to another—there are no important
inertial forces governing the inﬂation rate,
as opposed to the price level, within our
model economy.
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16McCallum (1981) makes it
clear that such interest rate
policies are a feasible mode of
central bank behavior so long
as policy is conducted so as to
produce a nominal anchor for
the price level. Fang, Kerr, and
King (1995) show that an
interest rate policy will result in
unique outcomes so long as
f >0.
17We chose these values
[ f= 500 (strong policy) and
f = 0.1 (weak policy)] to pro-
duce clear graphics that illus-
trate the nature of the policy
rule.MAY/ JU N E 1 9 9 6
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Figure 9 a–h
Interest Rate Rule, Feedback from Price Level, 
Response to a Permanent Productivity Shock
Strong Feedback (o)    Weak Feedback (+)
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(a) Output
% DeviationsHowever, as indicated by the paths
marked money supply rule, there are im-
portant consequences of a change in the
money growth rate—as distinguished from
a change in the inﬂation rate—within the
model. Since a lower long-run inﬂation rate
will stimulate the demand for money, the
path of the price level must fall if there is a
decline in the long-run rate of monetary
growth. The process of transition from a
high price level path to a lower one can be
associated with substantial declines in eco-
nomic activity, as Figure 10 makes clear.
SUMMARY AND
CONCLUSIONS
We have explored the costs and 
beneﬁts of inﬂation targeting in a mod-
ern macroeconomic model of the link 
between nominal and real variables. From
the St. Louis model of 1972, we took 
an emphasis on monetarist speciﬁcation
of money demand, as well as of the im-
portance of expectations in price setting.
From recent developments in macroecon-
omics, we took the money demand func-
tion as arising from a speciﬁc transac-
tions technology, rational expectations,
and explicit dynamic modeling of con-
sumption, labor supply, investment, and
price setting. More speciﬁcally, we fol-
lowed work by Calvo (1983), Rotemberg
(1987), and Yun (1996) in modeling an
economy that combines short-run price
stickiness with rational decisions of ﬁrms.
We used our setup to evaluate the poten-
tial costs and beneﬁts of a policy of tar-
geting the inﬂation rate.
Our conclusions are in line with those
of earlier monetarists—Irving Fisher,
Milton Friedman, and the builders of the
St. Louis model. We found that the target
rate of inﬂation should be set at a low
level. At current U.S. levels of inﬂation,
the beneﬁts from low inﬂation (that is, the
economy reduces its time spent making
transactions) are ﬁrst order and the fric-
tions associated with imperfect competi-
tion and gradual price adjustment are sec-
ond order. We also found this perfect
inﬂation targeting policy produces re-
sponses to productivity and money de-
mand shocks that are in line with those
which would arise in a ﬂexible-price econ-
omy. Finally, we brieﬂy explored two is-
sues associated with the implementation of
an inﬂation targeting policy, showing that
it can be implemented with an interest rate
instrument and that there can be an imme-
diate disinﬂation without adverse conse-
quences for real economic activity.
               
       
       
       
                     
       
       
       
                           
               
                                 
MAY/ JU N E 1 9 9 6






               
       
       
       
                     
       
       
                           
               
                                 
(c) Price Level
               
       
       
       
                     
       
               
                           
                                 This study of an inﬂation-targeting
policy leaves open many interesting ques-
tions. First, our analysis of price dynamics
following Calvo was relatively rudimentary
in terms of the stochastic structure of
price adjustment. A more complete analy-
sis would permit a richer time pattern of
anticipated adjustment and also permit
that time pattern to respond to the state 
of the economy, speciﬁcally to the average
rate of inﬂation. Second, our analysis
leaves open the important question of how
a regime of imperfectly credible inﬂation
targets would operate. Third, it would 
be useful to pose the counterfactual ques-
tion, What would have been the welfare
gains if the United States had been on an
inﬂation-targeting regime during the post-
war period? These topics are the subject of
our continuing research into inﬂation tar-
gets within a St. Louis model of the 21st
century.
REFERENCES
Abel, Andrew B., and Ben S. Bernanke. Macroeconomics. Addison-
Wesley, 1992.
Andersen, Leonall C., and Keith M. Carlson. “An Econometric Analysis of
the Relation of Monetary Variables to the Behavior of Prices and
Unemployment,” in The Econometrics of Price Determination, Otto
Eckstein, ed. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
1972, pp. 166–83.
_____ and Jerry Jordan. “Monetary and Fiscal Actions: A Test of their
Relative Importance in Economic Stabilization,” this Review(October
1968), pp. 29–44.
Bailey, Martin J. National Income and the Price Level: A Study in
Macroeconomic Theory, 2nd ed. McGraw Hill, 1971.
Ball, Laurence. “Credible Disinﬂation with Staggered Price Setting,” 
The American Economic Review (Vol. 84, 1994), pp. 282–89.
Barro, Robert J. Macroeconomics, 3rd ed. Wiley, 1990.
Benabou, Roland. “Inﬂation and Markups: Theories and Evidence from
the Retail Trade Sector,” European Economic Review(Vol. 36, 1992),
pp. 566–74.
Blanchard, O. J., and N. Kiyotaki. “Monopolistic Competition and the
Effects of Aggregate Demand,” The American Economic Review
(September 1987), pp. 647–66.
Bodkin, Ronald G. “Wage and Price Formation in Selected Canadian
Econometric Models,” in The Econometrics of Price Determination, Otto
Eckstein, ed. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
1972, pp. 369–85.
Buiter, Willem H., and Marcus H. Miller. “Costs and Beneﬁts of an Anti-
Inﬂationary Policy: Questions and Issues,” in Inﬂation and Unem-
ployment: Theory, Experience, and Policymaking, Victor E. Argy and
John W. Neville, eds. London: Allen and Unwin, 1985.
Calvo, G. A. “Staggered Prices in a Utility-Maximizing Framework,”
Journal of Monetary Economics (September 1983), 
pp. 383–98.
Chirinko, Robert S. “Business Fixed Investment Spending: A Critical
Survey of Modelling Strategies, Empirical Results, and Policy
Implications,” Journal of Economic Literature(Vol. 31, 1993),
pp. 1,875–911.
Cooley, Thomas F., and Gary D. Hansen. “Tax Distortions in a
Neoclassical Monetary Economy,” Journal of Economic Theory
(December 1992), pp. 290–316.
de Menil, George, and Jared J. Enzler. “Prices and Wages in the FRMIT-
Penn Econometric Model,” in The Econometrics of Price Determination,
Otto Eckstein, ed. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
1972, pp. 277–308.
Dotsey, Michael; Robert G. King; and Alexander L. Wolman. “State
Dependent Pricing and the Dynamics of Business Cycles.” Manuscript,
University of Virginia and Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 1996.
Eckstein, Otto, ed. The Econometrics of Price Determination,Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1972.
_____ and Gary Fromm. “The Price Equation,” The American Economic
Review (Vol. 58, 1968), pp. 1,159–83.
_____ and David Wyss. “Industry Price Equations,” in The
Econometrics of Price Determination, Otto Eckstein, ed. Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1972, pp. 133–65.
Fang, Justin; William Kerr; and Robert G. King. “Limits on Interest Rate
Rules in the IS Model.” Manuscript, University of Virginia, 1995.
Friedman, Milton. The Optimum Quantity of Money, and Other Essays.
Aldine Publishing Company, 1969.
_____ and Anna J. Schwartz. A Monetary History of the United States
1867–1960. Princeton University Press, 1963a.
_____ and _____. “Money and Business Cycles,” Review of
Economics and Statistics (February 1963b), pp. 32–78.
Goodfriend, Marvin S. “A Framework for the Analysis of Moderate
Inﬂations.” Manuscript, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 1995.
Gordon, Robert J. “Discussion of Papers in Session II,” in The
Econometrics of Price Determination, Otto Eckstein, ed. Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System,1972, pp. 202–12.
Hayashi, Fumio J. “Tobin’s Marginal q and Average q: A Neoclassical
Interpretation,” Econometrica(January 1982), pp. 213–24.
Ibbotson, Roger, and Rex Sinquefeld. Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inﬂation: The
Past and the Future. The Financial Analysts’ Research Foundation, 1982.
King, Robert G. “Value and Capital in the Equilibrium Business Cycle
Program,” Value and Capital: Fifty Years Later, L. McKenzie and 
S. Zamagni, eds. London: MacMillan (1993), pp. 279–309.
MAY/ JU N E 1 9 9 6
FE D E R A L RE S E RV E BA N K O F ST. LO U I S
106_____ and Mark W. Watson. “The Solution of Singular Linear
Difference Models Under Rational Expectations.” Manuscript, University
of Virginia, 1995a.
_____ and _____. “System Reduction and Solution Algorithms for
Singular Linear Difference Systems Under Rational Expectations.”
Manuscript, University of Virginia, 1995b.
Lucas, Robert E., Jr. “Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique,”
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy (Vol. 1, no. 2
1976), pp. 19–46.
_____. “On the Welfare Cost of Inﬂation.” Manuscript, for the
Hitotsubashi International Symposium of Financial Markets and the
Changing World, 1993.
_____. “Supply Side Economics: An Analytical Review,” Oxford
Economic Papers (April 1990), pp. 293–316.
McCallum, Bennett T. “Price Level Determinacy with an Interest Rate Rule
and Rational Expectations,” Journal of Monetary Economics (Vol. 8,
1981), pp. 319–29.
_____ and Marvin S. Goodfriend. “Theoretical Studies of the Demand
for Money,” in The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics; John
Eatwell, Murray Milgate, and Peter Newman, eds. Stockton Press,
1987, pp. 775–81.
Okun, Arthur M. “Potential GNP: Its Measurement and Signiﬁcance,”
Proceedings of the Business and Economic Statistics Section of the
American Statistical Association, 1962, pp. 98–104.
Rotemberg, Julio J. “The New Keynesian Microfoundations,” NBER
Macroeconomics Annual.MIT Press, 1987, pp. 69–104.
Tobin, James. “The Wage-Price Mechanism: Overview of the
Conference,” in The Econometrics of Price Determination, Otto
Eckstein, ed. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
1972, pp. 5–15.
_____. “Inﬂation and Unemployment,” The American Economic
Review (March 1972b), pp. 1–18.
Wolman, Alexander L. “Three Essays on Monetary Economics.”
Unpublished dissertation, University of Virginia, 1996.
Yun, Tack. “Nominal Price Rigidity, Money Supply Endogeneity, and
Business Cycles,” Journal of Monetary Economics(Vol. 37,1996), 
pp. 345–370.
MAY/ JU N E 1 9 9 6
FE D E R A L RE S E RV E BA N K O F ST.  LO U I S
107